

## PREFACE

In the last decades, we have witnessed the emergence of powerful supranational institutions in the political sphere. This development provides a response to problems that are difficult to handle at the national level. However, it might be held that its desirability depends on the extent to which the institutions are democratic, or constrained by democratic decision-making processes. Indeed, it has been suggested that we should ultimately strive for a *global* democracy, and that part of the justification of the development of bodies such as the EU is that it provides a step in that direction.

It is proposals of this kind that provide the focus of the research project "Democracy Unbound", based at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, and funded by the Swedish Research Council. Some of the questions they raise are *normative*. For example, what *form* of democracy should we try to bring about at a supranational level? As we know, there are different notions of democracy, some of which are more demanding than others (e.g., regarding the participation and influence of the citizens). The significance of this question is illustrated by the ongoing debate about the appropriate role of the European Parliament within the EU. Other questions are empirical, and rather concern the *possibility* of a successful implementation of democratic institutions at a supranational level. Thus, one objection to the idea of a global democracy has been, not that it is undesirable, but that it is utopian and unrealistic. A serious exploration of these questions requires collaboration between researchers from several different fields, which is the idea underlying the formation of the research group. The group involves twelve researchers from four different fields: History, Law, Philosophy and Psychology. More information about the project is given at its web site: <http://www.philosophy.su.se/demokratiprojekt/gd/index.html>

The present volume comprises a number of articles that have been presented at the workshop "Democracy Unbound–Basic Explorations" in Trondheim (March 5-6, 2005), which is the first of a series of workshops to be arranged within the project. Many of the articles focus on fundamental and general questions about democracy, and the supranational perspective is not explicit. However, this is due to the fact that the project has just begun, and that the application to supranational democracy requires having the basics straight.

Gustaf Arrhenius paper explores 'the boundary problem'. The boundary problem concerns criteria for who are eligible to take part in which decision-making processes – how to delimit the *demos*. F.G. Whelan, one of the few theoreticians that have discussed the

boundary problem at length, claims that democratic theory cannot itself provide any solution to disputes that may – and historically do – arise concerning boundaries, and that the boundary problem, therefore, reveals one of the limits of the applicability of democracy. Arrhenius challenges this conclusion and suggests that it is based on a failure to take into account an important distinction between two ways of understanding democracy. He also tries to show that there are resources within the democratic tradition to solve the boundary problem.

In their article "Attitudes towards freedom and equality among Swedish and American students", Girts Dimdins and Henry Montgomery present a pilot study conducted at Stockholm University and Stanford University (where Dimdins currently has a post-doc position). The study compared Swedish and American attitudes towards freedom and equality and examined the perceived trade-off between both concepts in the two groups. First-year students from Stockholm University and Stanford University took part in the study. The participants ranked ordered a number of values—among them equality of opportunity, freedom of lifestyle, economic freedom, and freedom of speech—and indicated to what extent they were prepared to increase freedom in their society at the expense of reducing equality, and vice versa. The participants also indicated their preferences for different options in public policy decision scenarios. Preliminary data analysis revealed that there were no differences in terms of value preferences between both samples. But there was a difference in terms of readiness to compromise freedom for equality or equality for freedom. Participants with very strong preferences for either freedom or equality in the Swedish sample were more likely for compromise between both values than participants with strong preferences in the US sample. Participants with moderate preferences for freedom or equality in either sample were unlikely to give up freedom for equality or vice versa. The results are discussed in the context of previous cross-cultural studies comparing political value preferences in both countries.

The next paper ("Representative Democracy and Future Generations") is authored by Kristian Ekeli, a researcher at Norwegian University of Science and Technology, who participated at the conference but who is not a member of the research group. The aim of the paper is to consider whether some seats in a democratically elected legislative assembly ought to be reserved for representatives of future generations. He proposes a new democratic model for representing posterity. It is argued that this model has several advantages compared with a model for the democratic representation of future people previously suggested by Andrew Dobson. Nevertheless, the democratic model that I propose confronts at least two difficult problems. First, it faces perhaps insoluble problems of representative legitimacy. Second, one

might question whether this model provides a reasonably effective way to represent future interests compared with existing representative democratic institutions. Despite such problems, it is argued that political representation of posterity can be defended on the basis of fundamental ideas and ideals in recent theory of deliberative democracy.

A currently influential approach to democracy that has rather recently emerged stresses the importance of decisions being preceded by public deliberation in which everyone is invited to participate on free and equal terms, and is accordingly labeled "Deliberative Democracy". In his paper "Where to Look for Deliberative Democracy", Andreas Føllesdal asks which empirical questions this approach raises. At least five issues are identified. (1) What are the characteristics and the main claims of interesting and distinct TDD? (2) Which are the best alternative theories and their implications? (3) Does deliberation actually occur in ways that only some TDD can explain? (4) What institutional and cultural factors are conducive to normatively attractive deliberation, under what conditions? (5) How just, reasonable or legitimate are the outcomes of a proposed theory, both when its norms are generally complied with and under conditions of partial compliance? Føllesdal, who is a member of the reference group tied to the project, discusses which research is needed to answer these questions.

Another member of the reference group is Bob Goodin. His article "No Party Democracy" explores the following question: What is the role of political parties in a democracy? It approaches this question through a thought experiment: imagine a political system that is thoroughly democratic, but lacks parties. How would politics in that world differ? In the absence of parties, politics would be more personalistic, more clientelistic, more patronage-oriented, more concerned with administration than with politics, and more oriented toward identity-group politics. What would be most conspicuously lacking is any systematic pursuit of the 'politics of ideas'. Laws enacted by legislators lacking the coordinated intentions that parties provide would be lacking a *ratio*, in some important sense. And that is required if we are to fulfill the central ambition of democratic politics, of 'giving laws to ourselves'.

An influential tradition in political philosophy derives the justification of political authority from the idea of a social contract. In his paper "Justification and Consent. The Idea of a Social Contract", Magnus Jiborn discusses this idea. Should we think of the contract as a real historical event or as merely a hypothetical construct? This paper discusses and defends an evolutionary interpretation of the social contract that draws on Hume's account of convention. The social contract, on this interpretation, is a convention, or a set of conventions,

that helps people coordinate on mutually beneficial equilibria in some recurring problem(s) of collective action. Such a contract need not be the result of a conscious act of joint decision making, but could emerge as the result of dynamical process of adaptation. The question is whether this interpretation of the social contract compatible with the normative claims that social contract theory is traditionally associated with? In what sense does it address the issue of justification? Drawing on the analysis of some different games of collective action, Jiborn argues that coordinating on a cooperative equilibrium in these games can be said to represent an informal, implicit agreement: each agent implicitly consents to the actions of each of the others in the sense that each prefers that each of the others act in the way they do. He also argues that such implicit agreement is relevant for the question of justification.

Thomas Kaiserfeld's article "Expertise Unbound: The Role of Experts in Heterogenous Decision-Making Processes" concerns the role of scientific expertise in a supranational setting. It is argued that scientific expertise is needed not only for the quality and quantity of the knowledge held, but also for their allegedly—an important specification—objective status declared both by themselves and by others. Thus, it is demand for experts' objectivity as much as the supply of expertise knowledge that should be used to explain the rising role of expertise in political decision-making processes. Furthermore, it is claimed that this demand results from the increasing risk of controversy following the heterogenization of political life and discourse, a trend implying more voices, social groups, networks etc. being involved in politics, at least formally.

Paulo De Narvaja, who pursues his graduate studies within the project discusses in his paper "State Neutrality and the Value of Autonomy" the arguments for the liberal idea that the state should not promote specific values or life styles in accordance with which individuals should lead their lives. A common way, especially among liberals, to argue for such neutrality, is by claiming that it follows naturally from the value of autonomy. The aim of Narvaja's paper is to examine this correlation. He argues that we have good reasons to doubt state neutrality can get support from the value of autonomy, unless we rely on an implausible conception of autonomy.

Different attempts have been made to answer Wilhelm Reich's question why the majority of those who are hungry *don't* steal and why the majority of those who are exploited *don't* strike. In his paper "Rational Unjustice", Torbjörn Tännsjö offers a new approach to this question. The two most influential approaches have been the ideological one and the gunman theory. The gunman theory seems to have the upper hand in that it not only explains many cases of successful oppression by a minority of a majority but also in that it explains why

ideology is a widespread phenomenon in society. However, there are cases where oppression takes place in the absence of any gunman. The usual example is the democratic welfare state. Another one would be a country like South Africa, where democracy has been introduced but where old structures from apartheid seem recalcitrant. Tännsjö suggests that we can conceive of such instances of (continued) oppression by a minority of a majority as cases of rational injustice. Because of transaction costs, from an unjust and suboptimal order, to a just and optimal order, there is no way that the oppressed majority can reach its desired equilibrium. Unless the privileged minority accepts the introduction of just institutions, there is no way of introducing them. And, for simple egoistic reasons, the minority doesn't cooperate with the majority.

The discussion at the conference of Ekeli's paper led to an exchange between Lars Bergström and Torbjörn Tännsjö, which in turn led to that each wrote a short paper. These papers are published in this volume in an Appendix. The exchange concerns the extent to which we have a responsibility towards future generations and how this responsibility should be reflected in current political institutions.

It should be noted that the articles in the volume are *preprints*. This means that they may be revised and published elsewhere. For this reason, the authors welcome comments and objections (contact information can be found through the project's web site). In preparing this volume, I have received important help from Therese Björkqvist, Marcus Linnér, and Lisa Wiholm. Special thanks are due to May Thorseth, one of the senior researchers in the project, who organized the workshop in Trondheim, and who is responsible for making it such a fruitful and enjoyable event. I also gratefully acknowledge the support from the Swedish Research Council.

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