Professor och innehavare av lärostolen i praktisk filosofi vid Uppsala universitet.

Född 1964. Jag doktorerade i Stockholm 1993 men tillbringade en del av forskarutbildningen vid Cornell University. Jag befordrades till professor i praktisk filosofi i Stockholm 2003, där jag även varit verksam som forskarassistent, lektor och docent. Jag har dessutom varit gästforskare vid Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (2000), vikarierande professor vid Göteborgs universitet (2002-2003), associate professor vid University of Auckland, New Zealand (2005-2007) samt gästforskare vid The Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (2008.8-2008.12).

Moral Disagreement. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 (pocketutgåva 2009). (Se en recension av boken i Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews här.)

• Reflective Equilibrium. An Essay in Moral Epistemology, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993. Abstract

Tillsammans. En filosofisk debattbok om hur vi kan rädda vårt klimat, Bonnier Fakta, 2009. (För en essä i DN som diskuterar boken, följ denna länk. För några rättelser av korrfel i boken, följ denna).

Hur bör du leva?, Wahlström & Widstrand, 2004 (pocketutgåva 2005). Förord

Fem filosofiska frågor, Wahlström & Widstrand, 2001 (pocketutgåva 2003). Förord

• Filosofiska frågor (med H. Ahlenius, S. Carlshamre, B. Haglund och B. Molander), Utbildningsradions förlag, 1998.

• Argumentationsanalys (med G. Björnsson, U. Kihlbom och A. Ullholm), Natur och Kultur, 1994.

"The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, 2008, 389-405.

"Are We Lovers of the Good?", Synthese 138, 2004, 247-60.

"Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists", Theoria 65, 1999, 70-85.

"Quine on Ethics", Theoria 64, 1998, 84-98. pdf

"Stimulus Meaning Debunked", Erkenntnis 49, 1998, 371-85.

"Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement", Philosophical Quarterly 48, 1998, 359-65.

"Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency", Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, 1995, 361-71. pdf

"Coherence and Disagreement", Philosophical Studies 65, 1992, 305-17.

"Disgreement, Moral", in International Encyclopedia of Ethics (eds. Hugh LaFolette, John Deigh and Sarah Stround), Wiley-Blackwell, (forthcoming).

"Ethics, Theoretical Rationality and Eliminativism About Belief", in Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz. Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel (eds. Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg and Rysiek Sliwiniski), Uppsala Philosophical Studies 57, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2009.

"Ethics and Film", in Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, eds. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga, London: Routledge, 2008.

"Davidson and Quine's Empiricism", in Interpreting Davidson, eds. P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal, San Fransisco: CSLI Publishers, 2001, 269-83. pdf

Recension av Davidson, D., Problems of Rationality, Theoria 72 (2006).

Recension av Crisp, R., Routledge philosophy guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism and Riley, J., Routledge philosophy guidebook to Mill on Liberty, Theoria 67, 2001, 177-83. pdf

Recension av Ekonomerna i debatten: Gör de någon nytta? (Jonung, L., red.), Tidskrift för politisk filosofi nr. 1, 1998.

"Drömmar om det blå", Arena nr 3, 2002, 28-9.

"Hur skulle det gå om alla gjorde så? Om individuell rationalitet och kollektiv galenskap", Tvärsnitt nr. 2, 1998.

"Om Erikssons grader av synd", Filosofisk tidskrift nr 3, 1997, 50-53.

"Robert Nozick och libertarianismen", Hjärnstorm nr. 50-1, 1994, 11-13.

"Onda cirklar och goda", Filosofisk tidskrift nr 4, 1994, 43-46.

Redigering

2009. ‘Non-Debunking Evolutionary Explanations of Moral Intuitions’, James Martin Advanced Research Seminar, Oxford University (3/6).

2009. ‘Non-Debunking Evolutionary Explanations of Moral Intuitions’, Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference, Stockholms universitet (30/5).

2009. ‘The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology’, The Annual Meeting of the Danish Philosophical Society, Aarhus University, Denmark (27/2).

2008. ‘Can Intuitions be Evidence?’, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala (28/11).

2008. ‘Are Ethical Non-Cognitivists Committed to Non-Cognitivism About (Theoretical) Rationality? Sixth European Congress of Analytical Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland (21/8).

2007. ‘Are Ethical Non-Cognitivists Committed to Non-Cognitivism About (Theoretical) Rationality?”. Australasian Association of Philosophy (New Zealand Division), Annual Conference (6/12).

2007. ‘Demon-Exorcism. On Sinnott-Armstrong's Moderate Pyrrhonian Skepticism’, Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, New Zealand (1/8).

2006. ‘Fresh Air?’, Department of Philosophy, University of Waikato, New Zealand (6/4).

2006. ‘Fresh Air?’, Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, New Zealand (24/3).

2006. ‘Fresh Air?’, Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Hong Kong (14/2).

2005. ‘The Latitude Idea’, The Oxford Center for Ethics & Philosophy of Law, Oxford University, England (21/2).

2004. Commentator at the ”Wedberg Lectures”, Stockholm University (the lectures were given by John Broome).

2003. ‘Donald Davidson on Triangulation and Subjectivity’, Danish National Research Foundation: Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Denmark (29/4).

2002. ‘Are We Lovers of the Good?", Colloquium on the Internalism-Externalism Dispute and the Theory of Interpretation, Philosophical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic (8/4-10/4).

2001. ‘The Unclear Basis of Epistemology’, Contemporary Issues in Metaphilosophy, University of Tromsø, Norway (30/11-2/12).

2001. ‘Learning from Disagreement’, Institut for Filosofi, Pædagogik og Retorik, Københavns universi-
tet, Denmark (16/3).

2001. ‘Davidson, Coherentism and the Priority of Observation Sentences’, Annual Philosophy of Science Conference Inter-University Center for Postgraduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Croatia (9-14/4).

2000. ‘Moral Disagreement’, Department of Philosophy, Edinburgh University, England (28/4).

2000. ‘Attributing Moral Judgments’, Department of Philosophy, Edinburgh University, England (26/4).

2000. ‘Attributing Moral judgments’, Seminar on The Notion of Interpretation in Philosophy and
Literary Theory, Philosophical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic (4/12-5/12).

2000. ‘The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement’, British Society for Ethical Theory Conference, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands (13/7-16/7).

1999. ‘The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement’, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia (16/12).

1996. ‘Davidson and Quine’s Empiricism’, The 1996 Karlovy Vary Symposium on Analytical Philosophy, Czech Republic (10/9).