

# Jan Klingelhöfer

February 2010

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## PERSONAL INFORMATION

Born August 3rd 1976; German Citizen

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## EDUCATION

Institute for International Economic Studies  
Stockholm University  
*Graduate Student in Economics*

Stockholm, Sweden  
2007-September 2010 (expected)

Stockholm University  
*PhD Candidate in Economics*

Stockholm, Sweden  
2004-September 2010 (expected)

Harvard University  
*Visiting Student*

Cambridge, MA, USA  
2006-2007

Tilburg University (Center)  
*Master of Sciences in Economics*

Tilburg, Netherlands  
2002-2003

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
*Diplomvolkswirt*

Berlin, Germany  
1997-2002

Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration  
*Exchange Student*

Bergen, Norway  
1999-2000

Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Gymnasium (High-School)  
*Abitur*

Remscheid, Germany  
1996

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## RESEARCH FIELD

Political Economics

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## JOB MARKET PAPER

### “The Swing Voters’ Blessing”

**Abstract:** I model elections with quality differences between two ideological candidates. The quality differences are only observable to a limited number of informed voters. I show that if uninformed voters follow an optimal strategy of making their voting decisions only dependent on their ideological position relative to the median voter, the candidate who is preferred by the median voter wins. Furthermore, I show that the existence of boundedly rational uninformed voters who always support the candidate whose policy offer is most attractive increases the welfare of the majority of voters. It forces candidates to announce positions closer to the median voter's bliss point. This is "The Swing Voters' Blessing".

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## OTHER RESEARCH PROJECTS

### 1. “Lobbying and Elections”

**Abstract:** The existing literature on lobbying is large, but only a few papers allow for the interaction of lobbying and elections. The most important one is Besley and Coate (2001). They use their well-known citizen candidate framework and come to the conclusion that if citizen candidates with extreme enough preferences are available, lobbying has no influence on implemented policy. The reason is that rational voters are able to predict what kind of policy a citizen candidate is going to implement after being elected and lobbied. Therefore, voters support the candidate whose expected implement policy they prefer, rather than a candidates with their own preferences, as in the usual setup without lobbies. The implemented policy turns out to be the same as in a world without lobbies. I show that the results of Besley and Coate do not apply in a more realistic model with ideological parties instead of citizen candidates because the parties cannot adjust their policy positions. In a two-party system, this means that even if forward-looking voters are aware that lobbying will take place, their choice between policies is different when lobbies exist. However, nothing rules out that the average as well as the median voter is better off. One interesting result is that the existences of a lobby can increase the electoral prospects of the party which it does not prefer to win. If the lobby can credibly commit to undertake none or only limited lobbying efforts after the elections, it is often better off.

### 2. “Are Backward-looking and Forward-looking Voting reconcilable?”

**Abstract:** Modeling elections and their impact on implemented policies is one of the most important subjects in the field of Political Economics. This paper reconsiders the division of models with forward-looking voters from those with backward-looking voters by developing a model that incorporates motives from both literatures. There is no uncertainty and parties can in advance commit to the ideological dimension of policy, but not to a level of rent payments. I find an equilibrium in which voters achieve the same limit to rent payments as in a purely backward looking model, while the policy that is preferred by the median voter is implemented as in a standard Downsian model of spatial political competition.

### 3. “A Voting Model with Greedy Politicians”

**Abstract:** In standard political economy models the fight for the leadership of a country is decided with the outcome of the general elections. However, some of the interesting aspects of the fight for offices and rents just begin at this point of time. I present a model in which the party that loses the general elections can still try to capture the majority in Parliament by convincing MPs of the majority faction to switch sides. These attempts are not successful in equilibrium. Nonetheless, the results of the general elections are partly determined by this additional stage of political conflict. Larger majorities are shown to lead to lower rent payments, and some voters therefore face a trade-off between lowering rent payments by supporting the party that wins the elections or supporting their preferred party. Multiple equilibria in the general elections with either party winning are possible.

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## SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Institute for International Economic Studies Main Seminar	Stockholm, Sweden October 2009
Conference “The Economics of Political Economics” Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore	Milan September 2009
Stockholm School of Economics Economics Lunch Seminar	Stockholm, Sweden September 2009
Association for Public Economic Theory (APET) 10th International Meeting	Galway, Ireland June 2009
Augustin Cournot Doctoral Days University of Strasbourg	Strasbourg, France April 2009
MIT Political Economics Breakfast	Cambridge, USA March 2009
European Network for Training in Economic Research Jamboree	Madrid, Spain February 2008
Workshop Political Economy TU Dresden and the CESifo Institute	Dresden December 2007
MIT Political Political Economics Breakfast	Cambridge, USA March 2007
Harvard Research Workshop in Political Economy	Cambridge, USA November 2006

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## WORK EXPERIENCE

Sveriges Riksbank <i>Summer Internship</i>	Stockholm, Sweden Summer 2006
European Business School <i>Research Assistant, Chair of Economic Policy and International Political Economy</i>	Ostrich-Winkel, Germany 2004
German Air Force <i>Military Service</i>	Holzendorf, Germany 1996-1997

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## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Stockholm Doctoral Program <i>Teaching Assistant, “Political Economics” (Graduate Level)</i>	Spring 2008 and Spring 2009
Stockholm University <i>Teaching Assistant, “Microeconomics” (Advanced Undergraduate Level)</i>	Spring 2006
European Business School <i>Teaching Assistant, “Macroeconomics” (Undergraduate Level)</i>	Spring 2004

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## AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

Grant from Handelsbanken's Research Foundations <i>Funding for PhD studies</i>	Since 2007
Hedelius scholarship, Svenska Handelsbanken <i>Funding for two-semester PhD studies at Harvard</i>	2006-2007
Widar Bagge Scholarship <i>Funding for first-year PhD studies</i>	2004-2005
Center Scholarship Tilburg University <i>Funding for Master studies</i>	2002-2003

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## LANGUAGE SKILLS

German: *Mother tongue*

English: *Fluent*

Swedish: *Fair*

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## REFERENCES

### **Torsten Persson**

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Institute for International Economic Studies  
Stockholm University  
torsten.persson@iies.su.se

### **David Strömberg**

Professor of Economics  
Institute for International Economic Studies  
Stockholm University  
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### **Philippe Aghion**

Professor of Economics  
Department of Economics  
Harvard University  
paghion@fas.harvard.edu

### **Ethan Kaplan**

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Institute for International Economic Studies  
Stockholm University  
ethan.kaplan@iies.su.se