Spring 2010
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| 18/2 |
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Nick Zangwill (Durham) |
Metaphor, Inexpressibility, and the Ways of Value: Beyond Thickiphobia
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| 18/3 |
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Terry Horgan (Arizona) |
Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the 'Paradox' of Supererogation
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25/3
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John Broome (Oxford) |
The Ethics of Climate Change and the Risk of Catastrophe
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| 15/4 |
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Lydia Goehr (Columbia) |
Ekphrasis: Saying, Showing, and Singing in the Contest of the Arts |
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29/4)
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David Enoch (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) |
Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement |
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How
should you update your (degrees of) belief about a proposition, when
you find out that someone else – as reliable as you are in these
matters – disagrees with you about its truth value? There are now
several different answers to this question – the question of ‘peer
disagreement’ – in the literature, but none, I think, is plausible.
Even more importantly, none of the answers in the literature places the
peer-disagreement debate in its natural place among the most general
traditional concerns of normative epistemology. In this paper I try to
do better. I start by emphasizing how we cannot and should not treat
ourselves as ‘truthometers’ – merely devices with a certain probability
of tracking the truth. I argue that the truthometer view is the main
motivation for the Equal Weight View in the context of
peer-disagreement. With this fact in mind, the discussion of
peer-disagreement becomes more complicated, sensitive to the
justification of the relevant background degrees of belief (including
the conditional ones), and to some of the most general points that
arise in the context of discussions of scepticism. I argue that thus
understood, peer-disagreement is less special as an epistemic
phenomenon than may be thought, and so that there is very little by way
of positive theory that we can give about peer-disagreement in general.
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20/5
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| Mohan Matthen (Toronto) | Sensory Knowledge
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| 27/5 |
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Douglas Patterson (Kansas) |
Truth as Conceptually Primitive
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